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ABSTRACT
Static analysis (aka offline analysis) of a model of an IP
network is useful for understanding, debugging, and verify-
ing packet flow properties of the network. There have been
static analysis approaches proposed in the literature for net-
works based on model checking as well as graph reachability.
Abstract interpretation is a method that has typically been
applied to static analysis of programs. We propose a new,
abstract-interpretation based approach for analysis of net-
works. We formalize our approach, mention its correctness
guarantee, and demonstrate its flexibility in addressing mul-
tiple network-analysis problems that have been previously
solved via tailor-made approaches. Finally, we investigate
applications of our analysis for two novel problems – auto-
matically generating test packets, and inferring a high-level
policy for the network – which have been addressed in the
past only in the restricted single-node setting.
1. INTRODUCTION
Analysis of the flow of packets across an IP network is an
important problem. It has varied applications, such as iden-
tifying anomalies in configuration files in routers [15], testing
of router implementations [5], checking whether a network
configuration satisfies a high-level policy of a network ad-
ministrator by querying properties of the configuration [9,
11], and inferring such a high-level policy automatically from
the network configuration [12, 6]. However, such an analysis
is challenging, because packet routing in an IP network is a
complex activity. Routers intervene between subnets (i.e.,
fully connected collections of hosts), and perform operations
on packets such as filtering, routing to adjacent routers or
subnets, and transformation, e.g., for network address trans-
lation (NAT). Each operation performed by a router is pred-
icated (i.e., guarded) by the current content of the header
of the packet, which, due to transformations, changes as
the packet flows through the network. There are additional
sources of complexity: The set of operations performed by
a router is not fixed once for all, but gets modified as the
network topology and load characteristics vary during op-
eration. Also, the outcome of some of these operations are
dependent not just on the content of the packet header, but
also on the state of the connection that the packet belongs
to. All of this means that it is quite difficult to analyze the
flow of packets across the network.
The state-of-practice for analyzing reachability is to send
test packets in the actual network, using commercially avail-
able tools. However, testing does not give complete infor-
mation about all possible packet flow outcomes, because it
is infeasible to send all possible packets across a network.
Several static (or offline) analysis approaches, e.g., [14, 15,
1], have been reported in the literature in order to overcome
this disadvantage; these approaches analyze a specification
of the network topology and router configurations (i.e., a
model of the network), and emit information that over- or
under-approximates all possible packet flows in the network.
1.1 Contributions
1) Our primary contribution is an abstract interpreta-
tion [4] based analysis for determining packet flow prop-
erties in an IP network. To the best of our knowledge ours
is the first reported approach for this problem that is based
on abstract interpretation, which is a technique that has
been typically applied to analysis of properties of programs.
Abstract interpretation is a customizable framework, in the
sense that it needs to be instantiated with a lattice (i.e.,
a domain of values to be used in the analysis), and a set
of transfer functions operating on this lattice. Therefore,
the analysis designer has the flexibility to use different lat-
tices of differing precision for the same problem, and prove
that each one results in a semantically valid (but poten-
tially approximate) analysis wrt the most-precise analysis.
We take advantage of this capability by first spelling out
a precise instantiation of our analysis, which always termi-
nates (because of bounded packet sizes), but which may be
expensive. Subsequently, we illustrate how to trade-off this
precision for scalability, while ensuring that the flow infor-
mation we compute is an over-approximation of the precise
flows. Previous static analysis approaches for network anal-
ysis are hard-wired, and do not readily admit such trade-offs
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within their overall approach.
2) We show that abstract interpretation is a flexible frame-
work, capable of determining varying information about packet
flows in a network. The first variant of our analysis, dis-
cussed in Section 4, computes a formula for each intermedi-
ate router that describes the set of packets that reach that
router. Determining reachability at intermediate nodes (i.e.,
routers) has many applications, such as querying network
policy [9, 11], and identifying rule anomalies and router
mis-configurations [15]. The above-mentioned approaches
employ custom solutions, which miss certain packet flows
(and hence may be unsound) in the presence of cycles in the
network. The problems addressed by these approaches can
be solved as straightforward postpasses after our sound and
generic reachability analysis.
The second variant of our analysis, discussed in Section 5,
computes information at each intermediate router that not
only represents the set of packets reaching that router, but
also the original forms of these packets as when they left
their originating subnets (before they were transformed by
address translation along the way).
3) We propose a novel application of our analysis. In pre-
vious work [12, 6] researchers have formulated the problem of
inferring a high-level policy of the network, in the restricted
setting of single-router networks. We first generalize this
problem to the setting of a network of multiple routers, and
then show how to solve it using the second variant of our
analysis.
2. RELATED WORK
The previous static analysis techniques for IP networks
that most closely resemble ours are the ones based on transi-
tive closure analysis [14], and graph propagation with bounded
unfolding of cycles [9, 11, 15]. All of these approaches com-
pute packet reachability information at all nodes in the net-
work. The work of Xie et al [14] is the seminal work in
the area of formally specified static analysis of networks.
For each pair of nodes i, j in the network, they compute
using Warshall’s transitive closure analysis a formula that
represents the set of packets leaving i that eventually reach
j along all possible paths. Xie et al pioneered the idea of
uniformly treating filtering and NATing as transformations
on (representations of) sets of concrete packets. The other
approaches mentioned above, rather than using transitive
closure, propagate (representations of) sets of packets ex-
plicitly along the edges in the network model. Our approach
is similar to these approaches in this regard.
The approaches mentioned above do not soundly analyze
packet flows along cyclic paths (i.e., they may miss certain
packet flow). Consider the example in Fig. 1. Part (b) of
this figure shows the configuration rules in the firewalls F1
and F2, in plain English form for the sake of clarity. Ba-
sically, F2 is a trusted subsidiary firewall that F1 sends all
packets to for the sake of filtering. Therefore, e.g., a packet
from Z1 addressed to Z2 takes the following (cyclic) path:
Z1-F1-F2-F1-Z2. This example, although trivial, illustrates
the subsidiary-firewall idiom commonly employed by net-
work administrators to avoid overloading key firewalls (F1,
in this case). The cycle in this path is not a “useless” cy-
cle, in the sense that certain end-to-end flows can happen
only through this cycle. In general, for any integer k, it is
possible to construct a cycle going through k routers such
that certain packets entering the cycle leave it only after
Z1 Z2F1
F2
(a)
• F1 forwards all packets from Z1 or Z2 to F2 along the F1-F2
link on the right side.
• F2 filters out bad packets, SNATs src address field of good
packets to a trusted address T , and forwards them to F1
along F2-F1 link on left side.
• F1 forwards all packets that have src address T (i.e., verified
packets) to Z1 or Z2, based on their destination address.
(b)
Figure 1: Packet propagation through cycles. (a)
Example network (b) Routing configuration
going through the cycle k times. Therefore, unrolling all
loops a fixed number of times (which is the idea behind the
approached mentioned above) is not sufficient. Abstract in-
terpretation involves an iterative analysis until a fix-point is
reached, and hence cleanly addresses this situation.
Model checking is another technique has been widely used
in the literature [10, 7, 1] for static analysis of networks.
While the former two approaches model the flow of a single
packet through the network, Al Shaer’s approach [1] mod-
els transitions of the set of all packets in a network. Since
packet sizes in IP networks are bounded, model-checking in
this domain is capable of precise analysis even in the pres-
ence of cycles. Additionally, model checking can directly
answer general temporal properties, in additional to reacha-
bility (abstract interpretation can answer restricted forms of
temporal properties, too, based on the abstraction chosen).
Model checking, like abstract interpretation, can also use ab-
stract domains to compute approximate solutions, e.g., as in
the Slam [3] approach (although the existing model-checking
based approaches for packet flow analysis do not do this).
The unique aspect of abstract interpretation is the formal-
ism that explicitly maps the abstract values in the abstract
lattice used to concrete values in the concrete domain (e.g.,
sets of packets), and uses this mapping as well as the prop-
erties of the given abstract transfer functions to prove that
the analysis is sound (i.e., computes an over-approximation
of the precise information).
3. MODEL AND TERMINOLOGY
A concrete packet is an IP packet in a network. We only
model the headers of packets; let pkSz be the total number
of bits in a packet header, partitioned into nFlds fields. We
denote the fields of a packet p as p.f1, p.f2, . . . , p.fp. These
fields include the source address and port, and destination
address and port. Let Pk represent the domain of all con-
crete packets.
We now describe our model of a network. A network con-
sists of a set of nodes N, which are partitioned into two
categories: a set of zones (i.e. subnets) Z, which are termi-
nal nodes, and a set of firewalls (i.e., routers) F, which are
intermediate nodes. We use zones to model organizational
subnets as single units; i.e., we assume that each zone z has
a set of publicly visible IP addresses addrz (with the sets
of distinct zones being non-overlapping), and that a packet
leaving or entering a zone contains only public IP addresses
of that zone or other zones in its header. We use n, ni, etc.,
to represent individual nodes, z, zi, etc., to denote individ-
ual zones, and f, fi, etc., to denote individual firewalls. Each
zone has a single interface connected to the outside world,
while each firewall has a set of one or more interfaces. E
is an irreflexive, symmetric, binary relation on the set of
all interfaces in the network, representing the physical links
between the interfaces; for any link (i1, i2) ∈ E, we assume
that i1 and i2 do not belong to the same firewall. We use
node(i) to denote the zone or firewall to which interface i be-
longs. When we say (m, i1)→ (n, i2), we mean (i1, i2) ∈ E,
node(i1) = m, and node(i2) = n.
We now describe our model of how each firewall is config-
ured; this is based on the widely used package Iptables [2].
Each firewall f has four tables: a DNATing table f.dnat , a
filtering table f.filt , an SNATing table f.snat , and a routing
table f.rt . Each packet entering a firewall through any of
its interfaces goes through the first three tables above, in
the order mentioned, and finally leaves through an interface
as decided by the routing table. We assume that firewalls
are pure routers; i.e., they don’t create or ultimately accept
packets. A filtering table is a sequence of filtering rules,
while each of the two NATing tables is a sequence of NAT-
ing rules. Each rule r (filtering or NATing) has two compo-
nents: its “guard” r.grd , which is a propositional formula on
the bits in a packet header, and “action” r.act . A concrete
packet c is said to match a rule r if c satisfies the formula
p.grd . A packet entering a table is matched against each rule
in the table sequentially until a matching rule is found; the
matching rule’s action is then taken on the packet, and the
remaining rules are ignored. For a filtering rule r its action
is either DROP or ACCEPT; if a packet matches a filtering
rule r, it is thrown away if r.act is DROP, and is sent out as
output from the table if r.act is ACCEPT. The final rule in
any filtering table has the guard true (i.e., is a default rule).
For any NATing rule f , r.NAT field is a number which rep-
resents the field in the packet header that is being NATed,
while r.act is a formula representing a range of values. If
the NATing rule matches a packet c then c.r.NAT field is
overwritten with one of the values in r.act , and the hence
transformed packet is sent out as output from the table. If
no rule in a NATing table matched a packet it is sent out
untransformed. DNATing rules write into the destination
address or port field, while SNATing rules write into the
source address or port field. The routing table f.rt of fire-
wall f is a function from the interfaces in f to formulas,
each of which is a constraint on destination addresses; i.e.,
if a packet c, after having gone through the DNAT, filtering,
and SNAT tables in a firewall, has destination address d, it
is then sent out of one of the interfaces i of f such that d
satisfies the formula f.rt(i).
Note in the discussion above that choices may have to be
taken by NATing rules as well as during the final routing
step. We do not model how these choices are made during
network operation, and instead, in our analysis, assume that
all choices are possible. Also, we assume the following on
the flow of concrete packets in the network: (a) There is
no IP spoofing; i.e., every packet leaving a zone z has a
source address that matches addrz, and a source port that
is within the valid port-range of z. (b) Every packet that
enters the network from a zone eventually reaches a zone
1. p.curr : Formula representing the set of concrete packets rep-
resented by p.
2. p.orig: Formula representing the set of original packets leav-
ing a zone that, after flowing through the network, become the
packets represented by curr.
3. p.ifNated : A vector of bits, one per field in a packet header.
p.ifNated .bi is 1 means p.curr .fi contains a value written by
NATing (by some firewall).
Note: The fields orig and ifNated are used only by the second
variant of our algorithm, discussed in Section 5.
(a)
1: Inputs: (1) A network configuration, (2) an originating zone
z0, (3) an abstract lattice, whose elements are abstract val-
ues, (4) an “initial” abstract value z0.from at zone z0, and
(5) transfer functions for links.
2: Outputs: For each node n, an abstract value n.abs (repre-
senting the set of concrete packets that could reach n).
3:
4: Initialize z0.abs to z0.from. Mark z.
5: For all nodes n other than z initialize n.abs to ⊥ (the bottom
element of the abstract lattice).
6: while there exist marked nodes do
7: Choose a marked node m, and unmark it.
8: for all link (m, i1)→ (n, i2) do
9: Replace n.abs with n.abs unionsq ff (i1,i2)(m.abs).
10: If node n was unmarked, or if new value of n.abs dif-
ferent from old value, then mark n.
11: end for
12: end while
(b)
Figure 2: (a) Fields in an abstract packet p ∈ AbsPk
(b) Propagation of abstract packets.
z that it is supposed to reach (i.e., its destination address
when it reaches z matches addrz), or gets dropped by a
filtering rule before it reaches any zone.
4. THE BASE ALGORITHM
Instantiating an abstract interpretation requires us to spec-
ify (a) an abstract lattice, whose elements are called abstract
values, which is closed wrt the join operation (i.e., least up-
per bound, or unionsq) (b) a directed graph on which the analysis
is to be performed, (c) transfer functions for the edges in
the graph, which specify the abstract propagation seman-
tics of the edges (as functions from abstract values to ab-
stract values), and (d) the initial abstract value at some
designated originating node z0 of the graph. In our set-
ting the nodes in the network are the graph nodes, and each
link (m, i1)→ (n, i2) in the network results in a graph edge
m → n. We show the abstract interpretation algorithm in
Fig. 2(b); this is basically Kildall’s algorithm [8], instanti-
ated to our setting. The idea behind the algorithm is to
keep track of an abstract value m.abs at each node m. In
our setting, each abstract value is a set of abstract packets
from the domain AbsPk , where each abstract packet in turn
intuitively represents a set of concrete packets. Whenever
the abstract value m.abs at a node m changes it is prop-
agated through each outgoing link (m, i1) → (n, i2) out of
m (see lines 8–11) using the transfer function ff (i1,i2) of the
link to the successor node n of the link; at n this incoming
value is joined with the current abstract value at n. The
algorithm terminates when the abstract values at all nodes
stabilize (i.e., reach a fix-point); these values represent the
result of the algorithm.
Both variants of our algorithm share the basic structure
mentioned above. However, they differ in the content of the
abstract packets, and in the join operation and the transfer
functions. We discuss the initial variant of the algorithm in
this section, and the second variant in the next section. For
the initial variant each abstract value is a singleton set, i.e.,
a single abstract packet. Each abstract packet p, in turn, is
a structure with a single field curr , which is a propositional
formula on the bits b0, b1, . . . , bpkSz in a packet header; see
Fig. 2(a), ignoring the fields orig and ifNated for now (they
are used by the second variant of our algorithm). An ab-
stract packet p represents exactly the set of concrete pack-
ets that satisfy the formula p.curr . For instance, assuming
packet headers have only three bits, the formula b2 ∧ ¬b0
represents the set of packet headers {100, 110}. This is for-
malized using the mapping γ from abstract packets to sets
of concrete packets, and its inverse mapping α:
γ(p) = {c | c is a concrete packet, and c satisfies
p.curr}
α(s) = p, such that γ(p) = s
Since the abstract packet n.abs at a node n is meant to
represent the set of concrete packets that reach node n along
all possible paths, it is natural for the join operator to be log-
ical OR; i.e., p1unionsqp2 = p3, where p3.curr = p1.curr∨p1.curr .
The “initial” abstract value z0.from at the originating zone
z0 is an abstract packet such that its formula curr is satisfied
by all concrete packets whose source address is in addrz0 .
The transfer functions are shown in the appendix; ignore the
statements labeled “Variant 2” or “Inferring policy” for now.
Routine filter tableTF (t, In) in Section A.2 is the pseudo-
code for the transfer function for a filtering table t; (In is
the set of abstract packets coming into t, while the return
value is the set of abstract packets that come out of t. Sim-
ilarly, nat tableTF (t, ) in Appendix A.4 is the pseudo-code
for the transfer function for a NATing table t. For each
filtering or NATing table t its transfer function ff t has the
signature AbsPk → AbsPk , and captures the sequential ef-
fect of all the rules in the table. For any abstract packet p,
the abstract packet ff t(p) represents precisely the set of con-
crete packets that would result when the concrete packets
represented by p flow through the table.
The routine filter ruleTF (r, p) in Appendix A.1 is the
pseudo-code for the transfer function for an individual filter-
ing rule r, applied to an incoming abstract packet p. Sim-
ilarly, the routine nat ruleTF (r, p) in Appendix A.3 is for
the transfer function for an individual NATing rule r. In
both these transfer functions an incoming abstract packet
could get split into two outgoing abstract packets, one that
matches the rule (and gets the formula p.curr ∧ r.grd), and
one that does not match the rule (and gets the formula
p.curr ∧ ¬r.grd). In addition, each NATing rule r updates
the field indicated by r.NAT field of the incoming packet p,
by writing into this field the values in the range r.act . This
is accomplished by subroutine natPacket(p, r). The trans-
fer function ff (i1,i2) of a link (m, i1) → (n, i2) is shown in
Appendix A.5, and is the only transfer function to be in-
voked directly by our propagation algorithm in Fig. 2. It
works as follows: When given an abstract packet p, it routes
the packet through the tables m.dnat ,m.filt , and m.snat , in
that order. Finally, it refines the packet to exclude concrete
packets that it represents that have destination addresses
that do not satisfy the formula m.rt(i1).
For an illustration consider the example network in Fig. 3(a),
Z1 10.192.29.1 
10.192.29.255
to
Z3 202.65.23.2
Z2 Z4
10.192.28.1 
10.192.28.255
to
F1
Outside organisation
F2
(a)
# Guard Action
F1 filtering table:
1. s=10.192.29.[1-255], DROP
d=209.85.153.85
2. s=10.192.28.[1-255], DROP
d=209.85.153.85
F1 SNAT table:
3. s=10.192.29.[1-255] SNAT 202.67.34.[6-10]
4. s=10.192.28.[1-255] SNAT 202.67.34.[1-5]
F2 filtering table:
5. s=202.67.34.[6-10] DROP
(b)
Z1.abs = < [ 10.192.29.1-255 : true], [10.192.29.1-255 : true] >
Z2.abs = < [202.67.34.6-10 : 10.192.28.1-255],
[10.192.29.1-255 : 10.192.28.1-255] >
Z4.abs = < [202.67.34.6-10 : ¬{10.192.28.1-255, 10.192.29.1-255,
209.85.153.85, 202.65.23.2}],
[10.192.29.1-255 : ¬{10.192.28.1-255, 10.192.29.1-255,
209.85.153.85, 202.65.23.2}] >
(c)
(c)
Figure 3: (a) Example network (b) Firewalls con-
figuration (c) Reached abstract packets, with Z1 as
origin
the firewall configurations of which are shown in part (b).
Zones Z1, Z2, and Z3 belong to the same organization, while
Z4 models the outside internet. Firewall F1 is the primary
gateway of the organization. Zones Z1 and Z2 use private
IP addresses; Z1 uses the private address range 10.192.29.[1-
255], while Z2 uses the private address range 10.192.28.[1-
255]. F1 drops packets from these two zones to the blocked
outside host 209.85.153.85 – see Rules 1 and 2 (in the guards
s stands for source address and d stands for destination ad-
dress). Zone Z3 provides a service to the rest of the organi-
zation, and is accessible at the (public) address 202.65.23.2
(i.e., it is outside the organization’s intranet). F1’s SNAT
table translates the source addresses of packets coming from
zone Z1 to the (public) range 202.67.34.[6-10] (see Rule 3),
and the source adresses of packets coming from zone Z2 to
the (public) range 202.67.34.[1-5] (see Rule 4). Finally F2
denies access to Z3 for packets whose source address is in the
range 202.67.34.[6-10] (see Rule 5). This range corresponds
to packets that came originally from Z1 and were NATed by
F1.
Consider a run of our algorithm starting from zone Z1. No
abstract packet reaches zone Z3, because F2 denies access
from Z1. The abstract packet reaching each other zone is
shown in Fig. 3(c). Our notation is as follows: The text
inside each pair of angled brackets is an abstract packet.
There are two components inside each abstract packet p,
delimited by square brackets. The first component is p.curr ;
ignore the second component for now. For convenience, we
denote the formula p.curr as a pair of constraints on the
source and destination fields, respectively, separated by a
colon.
4.1 Correctness and complexity
The abstract interpretation framework guarantees termi-
nation and correctness as long as the instantiation (i.e., the
lattice, and the transfer functions) satisfy certain sufficient
conditions (we refer you to Cousot and Cousot’s paper [4]
for the details of the sufficient conditions). Since the for-
mula n.abs.curr at any node n keeps monotonically getting
weaker (due to joins), and since the number of distinct for-
mulas is finite (due to the fixed packet width), the algorithm
is guaranteed to reach a fix point and terminate.
Our transfer functions are precise, in the sense described
earlier. Also, our abstract lattice is precise, in the sense
that for any set s of concrete packets, γ(α(s)) = s (the
abstract lattice is called imprecise if for any set s we have
γ(α(s)) ⊃ s). Therefore, our analysis is precise; i.e., the final
abstract packet n.abs at each node n represents precisely the
set of concrete packets that will eventually flow through n
(after passing through all its three tables) assuming an initial
configuration wherein all concrete packets represented by the
abstract packet z0.from start out from zone z0.
Reachability analysis in networks is an NP-complete prob-
lem [7] (on the packet size). In the worst case there could
be an exponential number of paths to a node n in a network
and the abstract packet n.abs.curr at this node could in the
worst-case be updated O(2pkSz ) times during a run of the
algorithm. Our precise abstract-interpretation formulation
described so far, therefore, will have similar running time
requirement as model checking approaches reported in the
literature [10, 7], which also answer reachability.
4.2 Precision-efficiency trade-offs
A key benefit of abstract interpretation is that it uses a
join operation to merge abstract values reaching any node;
therefore, it is possible to tweak the abstract packet struc-
ture, as well as the join operation to improve efficiency (by
reducing precision). We illustrate this idea by consider-
ing one such optimization. Rather than have a single for-
mula describing all the p.curr bits in the packet header,
we model an abstract packet p as a sequence of formulas
curr1, curr2, . . . , currnFlds , where nFlds is the number of
fields in a packet header. This is typically called an indepen-
dent attribute analysis in the program analysis literature, as
opposed to a relational (i.e., precise) analysis. AND and
OR operations are now done separately on each pair of for-
mulas (of corresponding fields), while NOT of any sequence
of formulas is approximated as true (otherwise, the negation
of an abstract packet could result in exponential number of
abstract packets). Therefore, the worst-case number of up-
dates to the abstract packet at any node during a run of the
algorithm is now O(nFlds∗2fldSz ), where fldSz is the number
of bits in the largest field. This is exponential on the size of
the longest individual field, as opposed to being an exponen-
tial on the total size of the packet, which is a significant gain
in practice. While this analysis may over-approximate the
packet flows in the network, it still has value; e.g., if it says
that a certain (undesirable) packet flow is not possible, this
is guaranteed to be the case. Also, one could start with an
imprecise analysis, and then progressively improve its pre-
cision using the idea of counter-example guided abstraction
refinement, e.g., as in Slam [3], until the undesirable packet
Input: Two sets of abstract packets P1 and P2
Result = φ
for all abstract packets p1 ∈ P1 do
Let newCurr = p1.curr ∨
∨
{p2∈P2|p2.orig=p1.orig} p2.curr
Result = Result ∪ p, where p is a new abstract packet such
that p.curr = newCurr and p.orig = p1.orig
end for
return Result
Figure 4: Optimized join operation
flow to be verified is proved with certainty to be either pos-
sible or impossible.
5. EXTENDED ALGORITHM
In the first variant of our algorithm, discussed in the pre-
vious section, the field p.curr of any abstract packet p repre-
sents the set of packets that have reached the node where p
resides. Note that due to NATing, the current form of these
packets (as represented by p.curr) could be different from
their original form when they originally left the designated
source zone z0. In this variant of the algorithm we extend
the abstract packet to have another field p.orig , which repre-
sents the original forms of the packets represented by p.curr
when they left z0. This information, which basically aug-
ments the reachability information, is likely to be useful in
a variety of bug detection, understanding, and verification
tasks. We explore a specific application of this analysis later
in this section.
In this variant an abstract value (i.e., abstract lattice el-
ement) is a possibly non-singleton set of abstract packets.
The “initial” abstract value z0.from leaving the zone z0 is a
singleton set containing an abstract packet p whose curr and
orig formulas are identical, and are satisfied by all concrete
packets whose source address is in addrz0 .
As before, we formalize the semantics of each abstract
packet by defining α, γ maps that relate abstract packets to
concrete packets. To enable this we first extend our model
of the concrete packets. We let each concrete packet c have
two fields c.curr and c.orig , the first one of which repre-
sents its current contents, and keeps changing as the packet
flows through NATing rules, while the second one is fixed,
retaining its original form throughout. Now:
γ(P ) =
⋃
p∈P γ(p), where P is a set of abstr. packets
γ(p) = {c | c is a conc. packet, c.curr satisfies p.curr ,
c.orig satisfies p.orig},
where p is an abstract packet
α(C) = P , such that γ(P ) = C, where C is a set of
concrete packets.
In other words, the correctness guarantee of the algorithm
is that if an abstract packet p is in the set n.abs at some
node n, then for every concrete packet c1 that satisfies the
formula p.orig and for every concrete packet c2 that satisfies
the formula p.curr there is a path in the network from z0 to
n such that c1 is in z0.from and c1 becomes transformed to
c2 by the time it reaches n along the path.
In this setting a precise way to define join of two sets
of abstract packets P1 and P2 is set union. However, we
present an optimized version of this join in Fig. 4 which is
still precise, and is sufficient to guarantee the correctness
property mentioned above.
The transfer functions for this new lattice are the same
ones discussed earlier (shown in the appendix), except that
the lines labeled “Variant 2” are now included; ignore the
lines labeled “Inferring policy” for now. The changes to
transfer functions filter ruleTF ( , ) and nat ruleTF ( , ) can
be summarized as follows: as each packet flows through a
rule, the “orig” version is refined using the guard of the rule,
but only updating the fields that have not been NATed yet.
We keep track of which fields in p have been NATed so far
by any firewall along the path along which p flowed, using
an auxiliary bit p.ifNated .bl for each field l in the packet
header. The “orig” formula is not refined for fields that have
been NATed because for a NATed field the rule refers to the
new (NATed) value, and not the original value.
There are additional changes in the transfer function
nat ruleTF (r, p). If the field r.NAT field of p is being
NATed for the first time in the history of this packet, we first
extract the content of field l from p.curr (which still repre-
sents the original value of this field when the packet left its
source zone) and copy it to the corresponding field in p.orig .
This is done by calling routine update original packet( , ).
We then update the field r.NAT field in p.curr by calling
the natPacket( , ) (this is the same as in Variant 1 of the
algorithm).
The transfer function described above is precise, in the
sense that for any abstract packet p and any NATing table
t, the abstract packet ff t(p) represents precisely the set of
concrete packets that would result when the concrete packets
represented by p flow through the table. The net result of
this is that for any abstract packet p at a node n, p.orig
precisely captures the original forms of the packets leaving
z0 that reach n and that are represented by p.curr .
The semantics of the copying of field l from p.curr to
p.orig , mentioned above, can be stated more precisely is as
follows. We extract the original content of this field from
p.curr as a formula ml, which represents the set sl of orig-
inal concrete bit sequences that reside in field l of concrete
packets represented by p before the NATing happens. We
then update the formula p.orig , such that all concrete pack-
ets represented by it now have a bit sequence from sl in their
l field, but whose other fields are undisturbed.
Consider again the example in Fig. 3, where we run the
analysis starting from zone Z1. Note that a single abstract
packet p (delimited by angle brackets) reaches zone Z4 (see
Part (c) of the figure). The first component inside this ab-
stract packet denotes p.curr ; note that its source address
is the address range 202.67.34.6-10 that was written by the
NAT rule in F1. The second component denotes p.orig ; note
that its source address is the original source address range
of the packet leaving Z1 (i.e., 10.192.29.1-255).
5.1 Application: Inferring a high-level policy
of a network
Real-life networks can be large, with 5-500 intermediate
routers [14]. Configuring these routers correctly is a com-
plex and error-prone task. In a study of 37 real firewalls
Wool [13] found that each one of them was misconfigured,
and had security vulnerabilities. Therefore, it is important
for network administrators to have access to tools that infer
a compact, high-level policy from a network that has already
been setup, to help them debug and validate the configura-
tion. Tongaonkar et al [12] and Horowitz et al [6] have pro-
posed inferring a policy for a single firewall. In both these
approaches the initial step is to find the rules that have over-
lapping guards, and then to present a transformed, or dif-
ferently organized version of the ruleset. While Tongaonkar
et al flatten the ruleset, by eliminating all overlap between
them, Horowitz et al organize the rules hierarchically, with
rules with weaker guards placed “above” rules with stronger
guards. These ideas do not extend cleanly to the setting of
multiple firewalls connected as a network. Due to the large
number of rules in real networks, and because different sets
of rules may be correlated along different paths in a network,
it is not clear that rule correlations can be presented in a
natural, compact manner in this setting.
Our hypothesis is that in many cases it would help the
administrator if for each zone z, they are simply given an
“accept” formula that characterizes the set of packet headers
that leave z that eventually reach some other zone, and a
“reject” formula that characterizes the set of packet headers
leaving z that get dropped by some rule. The two sets may,
in general, be overlapping; a non-empty overlap should be
a matter of concern to the administrator, because packets
matching both these formulas may reach some zone, or none
at all, depending on the (non-deterministic) route they take
through the network. This pair of formulas for zone z is a
high-level policy, in the sense that it is compact, and conveys
useful end-to-end information whose representation is not
tied to the actual way in the which the network configuration
has been set up.
The first step in determining this high-level policy is to run
our analysis treating z as the “originating” zone z0. Then,
the “accept” formula for zone z is simply
∨
zi∈Z−{z}
zi.abs.orig
If the set of all filtering rules in the network with DROP
as the action is represented by D then the “drop” formula
for z is
∨
r∈D
r.dropped packets
where r.dropped packets is the set of packets (in their orig-
inal form) that match (and are hence dropped by) rule r.
These sets are anyway computed by our algorithm described
above during the normal propagation. Therefore, to support
this application, we simply save these sets during propaga-
tion (see the line with the comment “Inferring policy” in the
routine filter ruleTF ( , ) in Appendix A.1), and use them
here to construct the “drop” formulas.
In the example in Fig. 3, the “accept” formula for origin
zone Z1 is
[10.192.29.1-255 : ¬{10.192.29.1-255, 209.85.153.85, 202.65.23.2}]
which corresponds to Z2.abs.orig ∨Z4.abs.orig . The “re-
ject” formula for Z1 is
[10.192.29.1-255 : {202.65.23.2, 209.85.153.85}]
which corresponds to 1.dropped packets ∨
5.dropped packets, where 1 and 5 are rule numbers in
Fig. 3.
6. CONCLUSIONS, AND FUTURE WORK
We presented a novel abstract-interpretation based ap-
proach for packet flow analysis in IP networks. We provided
two different variants of the approach, for inferring different
properties, and provided formal claims of precision of the
analysis. We also illustrated the flexibility of abstract inter-
pretation in trading precision off for efficiency gains. While
we have taken the first steps in this direction, there are sev-
eral more-complex packet-flow analysis settings to which we
would like to extend abstract interpretation. These include
(a) accounting for transient changes in network configura-
tion and topology precisely (transient changes are modeled
by the transitive-closure-based approach of Xie et al [14]),
(b) addressing connection-oriented routing (i.e., stateful fil-
ters), (c) and answering (restricted) forms of temporal prop-
erties of networks. These settings lead to a much larger and
richer state-space than what we have considered in this work.
Previous approaches have not addressed all these issues to-
gether; our belief is that abstraction will be a key ingredient
in addressing them with reasonable precision and scalability.
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APPENDIX
A. TRANSFER FUNCTIONS
A.1 Transfer function for a filtering rule
Function filter ruleTF (rule : a filtering rule, p ∈ AbsPk)
Output: (Accepted ∈ 2AbsPk ,Unmatched ∈ 2AbsPk ).
{Accepted is a set containing zero or one abstract packets, that
represent concrete packets represented by p that are accepted
by the rule rule. Unmatched is a set containing zero or one
abstract packets, that represent concrete packets represented
by p that do not match rule.grd .}
Accepted ← φ,Unmatched ← φ
if rule.act == DROP then
if p.curr ∧ (¬rule.grd) 6= false then
p1← p
p1.curr ← p1.curr ∧ (¬ rule.grd)
p1.orig ← p1.orig ∧ ¬reduce(rule.grd , p1) {Variant 2}
Unmatched ← {p1}
end if
if p.curr ∧ (rule.grd) 6= false then
p2← p
p2.curr ← p2.curr ∧ rule.grd
p2.orig ← p2.orig ∧ reduce(rule.grd , p2) {Variant 2}
rule.dropped packets ← rule.dropped packets ∪ {p2.orig}
{Inferring policy}
end if
else if rule.act == ACCEPT then
if p.curr ∧ rule.grd 6= false then
p1← p
p1.curr ← p1.curr ∧ rule.grd
p1.orig ← p1.orig ∧ reduce(rule.grd , p1) {Variant 2}
Accepted ← {p1}
end if
if p.curr ∧ (¬rule.grd) 6= false then
p2← p
p2.curr ← p2.curr ∧ (¬ rule.grd)
p2.orig ← p2.orig ∧ ¬reduce(rule.grd , p2) {Variant 2}
Unmatched ← {p2}
end if
end if
return (Accepted, Unmatched)
Subroutine reduce(g: a rule’s guard, p ∈ AbsPk)
Output: A reduced guard g′, which does not refer to NATed
fields in p.
We assume g to be a conjunction of atomic predicates, each of
which refers to some field in an abstract packet.
Let g′ be the conjunction of the atomic predicates in g that do
not refer to any field i such p.ifNated .bi is 1 (this conjunction
is true if there are no such atomic predicates.)
return g′
A.2 Transfer function for a filtering table
Function filter tableTF (t : a a filtering table, In : 2AbsPk )
Output: A set of abstract packets that represent the concrete
packets represented by In that are accepted by some rule in
the filtering table t.
pSet ← In, Accepted ← φ
for all filtering rules r in t, in order do
pSet ′ ← φ
for all p ∈ pSet do
(Acc, Unmatched) ←
filter ruleTF (r, p)
pSet ′ ← pSet ′ ∪ Unmatched
Accepted ← Accepted ∪ Acc
end for
pSet ← pSet ′
end for
return Accepted
A.3 Transfer function for a NATing rule
Function nat ruleTF (rule : a NATing rule, p ∈ AbsPk)
Output: (Matched ∈ 2AbsPk ,Unmatched ∈ 2AbsPk ).
{Matched is a set containing zero or one abstract packets, that
represent concrete packets represented by p that are matched
by the rule rule, and hence will not be passed to subsequent
rules in the chain. Unmatched is a set containing zero or one
abstract packets, that represent concrete packets represented
by p that do not match rule.grd .}
if p.curr ∧ rule.grd 6= false then
p1← p
p1.curr ← p1.curr ∧ rule.grd
p1.orig ← p1.orig ∧ reduce(rule.grd , p1) {Variant 2}
if p1.ifNated .brule.NAT field = 0 then {Variant 2}
p1 ← update original packet(p1, rule)
end if
p1.ifNated .brule.NAT field ← 1 {Variant 2}
p1 ← natPacket(p1, rule)
Matched ← {p1}
end if
if p.curr ∧ (¬ rule.grd) 6= false then
p2← p
p1.curr ← p1.curr ∧ ¬rule.grd
p2.orig ← p2.orig ∧ ¬reduce(rule.grd , p2) {Variant 2}
Ummatched ← {p2}
end if
return (Matched, Unmatched)
A.4 Transfer function for a NATing table
Function nat tableTF (t : a dnat or snat table, In : 2AbsPk )
Output: A set of abstract packets that represent the concrete
packets represented by In after they are transformed by the
NATing rules in t.
pSet ← In, Out ← φ
for all NATing rules r in t, in order do
pSet ′ ← φ
for all p ∈ pSet do
(Matched, Unmatched) ←
nat ruleTF (r, p)
pSet ′ ← pSet ′ ∪ Unmatched
Out ← Out ∪ Matched
end for
pSet ← pSet ′
end for
return Out ∪ pSet
A.5 Transfer function for a Link
Function ff (i1,i2)(In: a set of abstract packets)
Output: A set of abstract packets.
S ← nat tableTF (node(i1).dnat , In)
S ← filter tableTF (node(i1).filt , S)
S ← nat tableTF (node(i1).snat , S)
Construct a filtering table t with a single filtering rule r that
drops all packets that don’t satisfy formula node(i1).rt(i1).
S ← filter tableTF (t, S)
return
⊔
S
A.6 Transfer functions for natPacket and
update original packet functions
Subroutine natPacket(p ∈ AbsPk , r : a NATing rule)
Output: A copy of packet p in which the field r.NAT field of
p.curr has been overwritten with the range of values r.act .
Subroutine
update original packet(p ∈ AbsPk , r : a NATing rule)
Output: A copy of abstract packet p, in which the field
r.NAT field of p.orig has been overwritten with the contents
of field r.NAT field of p.curr .
We do not provide a formal definition of the above two
formulas, which need to simulate updation of fields by for-
mula manipulation. Rather, we provide an illustration of
how they work. Let’s consider an example where the packet
header has two fields with 2 bits to represent each field.
Let p be the given packet and p.curr be defined by the
formula:
((b1 ∧ ¬b2) ∨ (b1 ∧ b2)) ∧ ¬b3 ∧ b4
where b1, b2, b3, and b4 are the four bits in the header of
p.curr .
Now let the given NATing rule be r and r.grd be true. Let
the action of r be to change the value of first field in packet
header to 00. Then the new value of p.curr , computed by
natPacket( , ) is given by the formula:
(((b1 ∧ ¬b2) ∨ (b1 ∧ b2)) ∧ ¬b3 ∧ b4)∧
((¬b′1) ∧ (¬b′2) ∧ (b′3 = b3) ∧ (b′4 = b4))
wherein the primed variables are now treated as the free
variables. The first line in the formula above represents the
original value of p.curr , while the second line captures the
fact that while bits b1 and b2 are both set to 0 bits b3 and
b4 are preserved.
Say before we do the NATing above the p.ifNated field
in the packet p is 01, indicating that field 1 has not been
NATed previously and field 2 has been NATed previously.
Also, let p.orig be defined by the formula:
(¬c3 ∧ ¬c4)
where c1, c2, c3, and c4 are the four bits in the header of
p.orig . Since we are now updating the first two bits of the
packet p.orig , and these have not been NATed before, we
update p.orig to the following formula:
(((b1 ∧ ¬b2) ∨ (b1 ∧ b2)) ∧ ¬b3 ∧ b4) ∧
(¬c3 ∧ ¬c4) ∧
((c′1 = b1) ∧ (c′2 = b2) ∧ (c′3 = c3) ∧ (c′4 = c4))
wherein the primed variables are to be treated as the free
variables. The first line above represents the old value of
p.curr ; the second line represents the old value of p.orig ;
the last line indicates that the new value of bits c1 and c2
are to the same as the values of old values of the bits b1 and
b2, respectively. This captures the fact that first two bits of
p.curr are being copied to p.orig .
We can simplify both formulas generated above by first
eliminating unprimed variables, and then renaming the
primed variables to their corresponding unprimed form.
